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FIRST AMENDMENT-DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT
CREATES A LEGAL HAZE
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982).
In Village of Hojiman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffnan Estates, Inc. ,' the
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the constitutionality of legis-
lation which regulates the sale of items that can be employed to facili-
tate the use of illegal drugs. In Hoftman Estates, the Court determined
that the municipal ordinance's definition of "drug paraphernalia" as
those items "designed or marketed for use" with illegal drugs was suffi-
ciently precise to defeat challenges of unconstitutional overbreadth and
vagueness.
The ordinance's focus on the design and marketing of items should
have been deemed unconstitutionally vague, however, because it fails to
provide standards for classifying the many items which have multiple,
drug related and non-drug related uses. Persons of "reasonable intelli-
gence" therefore might differ as to the ordinance's application. This
failure to provide adequate warning forces retailers to speculate as to
whether an item is "drug paraphernalia." In the final instance, how-
ever, this determination is made by those empowered to enforce the or-
dinance. The ordinance's lack of clarity thus invites arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, contrary to accepted notions of due process.
The Court's decision to select the Hoffman Estates ordinance for
review is also suspect. By selecting the unique Hoffman Estates ordi-
nance for review, rather than one of the numerous drug paraphernalia
statutes based upon the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted by the
United States Department of Justice,2 the Court did little to bring cer-
tainty to the realm of drug paraphernalia legislation.
1 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982).
2 MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA Acr (United States Drug Enforcement Admin. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT], reprinted in Drug Paraphernalia: Hearing Before the Select Comm.
on Narcotics Abuse and Control of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-95 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Drug Paraphernalia Hearing].
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I. FACTS OF Hoffnan Estates
On February 20, 1978, the Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois
Board of Trustees enacted Ordinance No. 969-1978 regulating the sale
of drug paraphernalia. 3 The ordinance prohibits any person from sell-
ing "any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory, or thing which is
designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined
by Illinois Revised Statutes,4 without obtaining a license therefor. ' 5
Under the ordinance, a business must file affidavits averring that the
licensee and its employees have never been convicted of a drug-related
offense, and must keep records, to be open for police inspection, of every
regulated item sold, including the name and address of the purchaser.6
Moreover, the sale of any regulated item to a minor is prohibited.7 Any
violation of the ordinance is punishable by a fine of not less than ten
dollars, nor more than $500.00, and a separate offense is deemed to oc-
cur every day that the violation continues.8 To facilitate the interpreta-
tion of the ordinance, the Village Attorney, Richard Williams, prepared
a series of licensing guidelines defining "Paper," "Roach Clips,"
"Pipes," and "Paraphernalia" as used in the ordinance.9
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., is an Illinois corporation engaged
in interstate commerce and located in Hoffman Estates. For three years
prior to the effective date of the ordinance, it sold a wide variety of
merchandise, including smoking accessories, jewelry, novelty devices,
and literature. Items sold included clamps, "alligator clips," mirrors,
3 The text of Ordinance 969-1978, entitled "An Ordinance Amending the Municipal
Code of the Village of Hoffman Estates by Providing for Regulation of Items Designed or
Marketed for Use with Illegal Cannabis or Drugs" is set forth in the Appendix.
4 Illinois statutes define "cannabis" and other controlled substances in the Cannabis
Control Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, § 703 (1971) and the Controlled Substances Act, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 56'/2, § 1102(g) (1971).
5 Village of Hoffman Estates, Ill., Ordinance No. 969-1978 § IA (May 1, 1978).
6 Id. at § ID.
7 Id. at § IC.
8 Id. at § 3.
9 The Guidelines for Ordinance 969-1978 provide:
LICENSE GUIDELINES FOR ITEMS, EFFECT, PARAPHERNALIA, ACCES-
SORY OR THING WHICH IS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE WITH IL-
LEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS
Paper-white paper or tobacco oriented paper not necessarily designed for use with ille-
gal cannabis or drugs may be displayed. Other paper of colorful design, names oriented
for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and displayed are covered.
Roach Clips--designed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and therefore covered.
Pipes--if displayed away from the proximity of nonwhite paper or tobacco oriented pa-
per, and not displayed within proximity of roach clips, or literature encouraging illegal
use of canabis or illegal drugs are not covered; otherwise, covered.
Paraphernalia-if displayed with roach clips or literature encouraging illegal use of can-
nabis or illegal drugs it is covered.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400, 405 (N.D. Ill.
1980),rev'd, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1981), re'd, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982).
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pipes of various types and sizes, and a wide variety of cigarette rolling
papers in numerous colors. t
Soon after the ordinance's enactment, and following an administra-
tive inquiry, the Village Attorney informed Flipside that it appeared to
be marketing regulated items. A copy of the ordinance and guidelines
was then made available to Flipside. Flipside alleged that it was unable
to determine which items were covered by the ordinance, and asked the
Village Attorney for guidance. Upon the Village Attorney's advice,
Flipside removed from its shelves over eighty items which were believed
to be covered by the ordinance."'
On May 30, 1978, rather than applying for a license or seeking clar-
ification through the Village's established administrative procedures for
licensing ordinances,' 2 Flipside filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging, inter alia, that the
drug paraphernalia ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague.' 3  Flipside sought injunctive and declaratory relief and
damages. 14
The district court denied Flipside's motion for a preliminary in-
junction.1 5 Shortly thereafter the court entered a Memorandum Order
awarding judgment to the Village, upholding the constitutionality of
the ordinance. 16
10 The literature sold by Flipside included A Child's Garden of Grass, Mar4'tana Grower's
Guide, and the magazine "High Times." Flipside also sold clamps, chain ornaments, scales,
large water pipes (some capable of being used by four persons), herb sifters, vials, and a
variety of tobacco snuff. One of Flipside's display items was a seven by nine inch mirror with
"Cocaine" printed on its surface. 485 F. Supp. at 403.
11 Id. at 404. When Larry Rosenbaum, a Flipside officer, consulted the Village Attorney
concerning which items at Flipside would be covered by the ordinance, he was advised to
register all items for his protection. Record at 87-88, cited in 639 F.2d at 375 n.1.
12 Ordinance No. 932-1977, the Hoffman Estates Administrative Procedure Ordinance,
was enacted prior to the Village's drug paraphernalia ordinance. It allows interested persons
to petition for the adoption of an interpretive rule. If the petition is denied, the petitioner
may place the matter on the agenda of an appropriate village committee for review. The
Village Attorney indicated that, because no one had yet applied for a license, no interpreta-
tive rules concerning the drug paraphernalia statute had been adopted. 639 F.2d at 385 n.30.
13 Flipside's complaint alleged that the ordinance is vague and thus void; that its terms
violated Article I of the United States Constitution because it interfered with Flipside's busi-
ness; and that the ordinance violated the commerce clause of the Constitution and deprived
Flipside of rights secured by the first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. 485 F. Supp.
at 404-05. See in/ra note 30 and accompanying text.
14 The named defendants were the Village, a home rule municipality of approximately
37,000 persons, and, in their individual as well as official capacities, the president, attorney,
chief of police, and trustees of the Village. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoff-
man Estates, 639 F.2d at 375 n.2.
15 485 F. Supp. at 410.
16 Id. While conceding that the Hoffman ordinance was "not a model of legislative clar-
ity," the district court nevertheless held that the crucial words of the ordinance were of com-
mon usage, thus providing guidance as to the ordinance's requirements. Id. at 406. The
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague on its face. ,7 The court
found that the language of the ordinance and the guidelines, with its
design and marketing approach, was vague regarding certain possible
applications. The seventh circuit stated that neither the ordinance nor
the guidelines distinguish between items that are inherently drug para-
phernalia and items which merely can be used as drug paraphernalia,
noting that the ordinance's licensing requirements could be triggered by
the sale of paper clips next to "Rolling Stone" magazine.", Further, the
court found that the vague nature of the design and marketing test cre-
ated a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against those
with alternative lifestyles.' 9 It held that the availability of administra-
tive guidelines and rule-making was insufficient to cure the lack of
clarity. 20
II. DEcisION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Marshall, reversed
the court of appeals in a unanimous decision, with Justice Stevens tak-
ing no part in the consideration or decision of the case.2' The Court
held that the ordinance did not violate Flipside's first amendment rights
since it does not restrict speech, but merely regulates the commercial
marketing of items which may be used for illicit purposes.22 It further
held that the ordinance is not overbroad, because the overbreadth doc-
trine does not apply to commercial speech. According to the Court, the
ordinance proscribed no other first amendment activities. 23 Finally, the
Court found that the ordinance was not void for vagueness, because
Flipside did not demonstrate that the ordinance was impermissibly
vague in all its applications. 24
Justice Marshall noted that the Court's first task in a facial chal-
court further held that no first amendment rights were abridged, since the ordinance does not
prohibit advertisement or "the expression of commercial ideas." Id. at 409. Finally, the court
dismissed Flipside's overbreadth claim, finding that the ordinance did not regulate any activ-
ity beyond the sale of paraphernalia designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs. Id
17 639 F.2d 373 (1981).
18 Id. at 382-83. The court further stated that "it appears that displaying almost any item
in the proximity of 'literature encouraging illegal use of. . . drugs' requires the store to ob-
tain a license and have persons sign the register." Id. at 382 (footnote omitted).
19 Id. at 383-84. See infra note 135.
20 Id. at 385-86. "But the mere possibility that the vagueness in this ordinance might later
be corrected by additional guidelines certainly cannot be a sound basis for holding it constitu-
tional." Id. at 386.
21 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1196 (1982).
22 Id. at 1192.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1193-94.
1368 [Vol. 73
1982] DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 1369
lenge alleging overbreadth and vagueness 25 is to determine whether the
enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct.26 If it does not, the overbreadth challenge fails. 27 Next, the
facial vagueness challenge must be examined. Assuming the enactment
implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, the challenge should
be upheld only if the enactment is vague in its application to the com-
plainant-a person engaged in clearly proscribed conduct cannot com-
plain of the ordinance's vagueness as applied to others.28 Thus, a court
should examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing hypotheti-
cal applications of the law.29
The Court began its analysis of Flipside's facial overbreadth chal-
lenge to the ordinance by quickly dismissing the claim that noncommer-
cial speech rights had been abridged.30 It held that while the ordinance
regulated the sale of items "within proximity of" "literature encourag-
ing illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs," the sale of literature itself is
not regulated or prohibited.31 Therefore, the Court stated the ordi-
nance did not proscribe noncommercial speech. Justice Marshall rea-
soned that although drug-related designs or names on cigarette papers
may subject them to regulation, the ordinance does not regulate speech,
but simply regulates the commercial marketing of items whose labels
25 "A 'facial' challenge, in this context, contends that the law is 'invalid in ftoo-and there-
fore incapable of any valid application.'" Id. at 1191 n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 474 (1974)).
26 In making this determination, a court should evaluate the enactment's ambiguous as
well as its unambiguous scope. The law's vagueness will be a factor in an overbreadth analy-
sis. "The Court has long recognized that an ambiguous meaning causes citizens to 'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone .. .than if the boundaries of the forbidden area are clearly
marked.'" 102 S. Ct. at 1191 n.6 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964)).
27 102 S. Ct. 1191.
28 "One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for
vagueness." . . . [T]o sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the
enactment is vague "'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to
an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no
standard of conduct is specified at all.' Such a provision simply has no core."
Id. at 1191 n.7 (citations omitted).
29 102 S. Ct. at 191.
30 Flipside alleged that the ordinance and licensing guidelines infringed upon its first
amendment rights in four ways. First, Flipside claimed that the ordinance is overbroad be-
cause it penalizes the sale of lawful items, and brings protected speech within its sweep. Sec-
ond, Flipside alleged that the ordinance placed a prior restraint on those who would sell
literature that might subjectively be deemed to be drug oriented when selling items of ordi-
nary use, items which would not otherwise be subject to the ordinance. Third, it asserted that
the ordinance infringes upon symbolic speech. The presence of drug-related designs, logos, or
slogans will trigger enforcement. Fourth, Flipside claimed that the use of an unspecified
"proximity" term to determine whether a display of lawful items will be deemed "marketed
for use with illegal . . . drugs" infringed upon constitutionally protected commercial speech.
Brief for Appellee at 25, 26.
31 102 S. Ct. at 1192.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
suggest that they might be used for an illicit purpose.32
Regarding commercial speech, 33 the Court expressed doubt that
the ordinance appreciably limited Flipside's communication of informa-
tion,34 with the obvious exception of the promotion or encouragement of
illegal drug use. Citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Company v. Public
Service Commission,35 however, the Court held that speech promoting ille-
gal transactions may be regulated or banned entirely by a govern-
ment.3 6 Again citing Central Hudson, the Supreme Court further held
that since the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial
speech, claims that the ordinance affects some innocent commercial
speech are irrelevant. 37 Justice Marshall stated that Flipside's conten-
tion that the ordinance is overbroad because it could extend to "inno-
cent" and "lawful" uses of items confuses the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines. An assertion that Flipside cannot determine
whether the ordinance regulates certain items with possible lawful uses
states a claim of vagueness, not overbreadth. 38
Justice Marshall next addressed Flipside's vagueness challenge, re-
lying upon the standards for evaluating vagueness enunciated in Grayned
v. City of Rockford.39 The Grayned standard identifies two societal goals
served by the void-for-vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine protects
against a government's attempt to subject an individual to an ordi-
nance's prohibition without "fair warning" as to what conduct is pro-
scribed. Second, it protects against arbitrary and discriminatory
application of the law by ensuring that adequate safeguards are pro-
32 Id.
33 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), the Supreme Court extended first amendment protection to "'commercial speech":
speech proposing a commercial transaction. The Virginia Pharnac
, 
Court reasoned that the
free flow of commercial information is essential to allow consumers to make informed deci-
sions. Id. at 763.
34 Flipside did not assert in its brief that its manner of item placement was motivated by a
desire to communicate information to its customers. Rather, items that the village considers
drug paraphernalia were placed near check-out counters because they are either "point of
purchase" items, items usually displayed next to cash registers, or items which are small and
prone to shoplifting. 102 S. Ct. at 1192 n.8.
35 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (Promotional activity of an electrical utility is protected commercial speech, de-
spite utility's monopoly over sale of electricity).
36 102 S. Ct. at 1192. In Central Hudson, the Court noted that no constitutional objection
can exist regarding the suppression of commercial speech that does not "accurately inform
the public about lawful activity," or which relates to illegal activity. 447 U.S. at 564.
37 102 S. Ct. at 1192.
38 Id. at 1192 n.9. This overbreadth contention is apparently not valid because Flipside
does not claim that totally innocent items are being proscribed (which would constitute over-
breadth) but, rather, that some of the proscribed items have alternative, innocent uses.
39 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
1370 [Vol. 73
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
vided to guide law enforcement authorities.40 Justice Marshall stressed,
however, that the Grayned standards should not be applied mechanically.
Rather, the nature of the enactment determines the degree of vagueness
that the Constitution tolerates. 4t Justice Marshall noted, for instance,
that economic regulation is subject to a less stringent vagueness test be-
cause its subject matter is often more narrow, and because business, by
virtue of the economic demands placed upon it, can be expected to con-
sult relevant legislation before taking action. 42 Further, the existence of
a scienter requirement in an ordinance may mitigate a law's vagueness,
especially with respect to the adequacy of notice.43 Finally, whether a
law threatens to inhibit constitutionally protected rights is extremely
probative in a vagueness determination. If protected rights are impli-
cated, a more stringent vagueness test applies. 44
The Court noted, in applying this analysis, that while the ordi-
nance nominally imposes only civil penalties, the Village's concession
that the ordinance is "quasi-criminal" because of its prohibitions and
stigmatizing effects might warrant a relatively strict test. 45 In reviewing
the ordinance under this stricter criminal test, the Court determined
that the law was sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside, hence defeating
Flipside's facial challenge.46 Flipside is required by the ordinance to ob-
tain a license if it sells "any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory, or
thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs, as defined by the Illinois Revised Statutes." Justice Marshall ex-
plained that Flipside expressed no uncertainty about which drugs are
covered by this description, since Illinois law clearly defines cannabis
40 Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordmgly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must pro-
vide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissably delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
41 102 S. Ct. at 1193. For example, enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties
receive greater tolerance because the consequences of imprecision are less severe. Id.
42 Id. at 1191 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); United States v. Na-
tional Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 83 (1963)).
43 Id. at 1193 (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1975); Boyce Motor Lines v.
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1945)
(plurality opinion)).
44 102 S. Ct. at 1193-94.
45 At argument, village counsel admitted that the ordinance is "quasi-criminal." Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 4, 5. The court of appeals, in reviewing the effects of the ordi-
nance, stated that "few retailers are willing to brand themselves as sellers of drug
paraphernalia, and few customers will buy items with the condition of signing names and
addresses to a register available to the police." 639 F.2d at 377.
46 102 S. Ct. at 1194.
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and other controlled substances.47 The words "items, effect, parapher-
nalia,. accessory or thing," however, fail to identify the type of merchan-
dise to be regulated. Thus, according to Justice Marshall, Flipside's
vagueness challenge must focus on the clarity of the "designed or mar-
keted for use" language.
While conceding that the ordinance and guidelines do contain am-
biguities, the Court decided that the "designed for use" standard was
sufficiently clear to cover at least some of the items sold by Flipside.48
The Court stated that this standard clearly encompasses items princi-
pally used with illegal drugs by virtue of their objective features: those
features designed by the manufacturer. It suggested that a person of
ordinary intelligence would understand that the standard applies to the
manufacturer's intent, rather than the intent of a retailer or customer.49
Further, it is sufficiently clear, according to the Court, that items used
principally for non-drug purposes are not "designed for use" with illegal
drugs.50
Justice Marshall stated that the ordinance's "marketed for use"
standard compensates for any ambiguities that the "designed for use"
standard might engender. Unlike the design standard, the marketing
standard does not require the often ambiguous item-by-item analysis. 51
Rather, the marketing standard describes a retailer's intentional display
and marketing of merchandise. With its intent component, the market-
ing standard necessarily requires scienter, since a retailer could not mar-
ket an item "for" a particular use without intending that use.5 2 Hence,
the retailer has ample warning that his marketing activities require a
license.
The Court found that under the marketed for use test, Flipside had
ample warning that its marketing activities required a license.53 It held
that Flipside clearly violated the ordinance's guidelines by displaying
the magazine "High Times" and such books as Marijuana Growers' Guide
and The Pleasure of Cocaine close to pipes and colored rolling papers.54
Further evidence of Flipside's intent to market drug paraphernalia was
47 See supra note 4.
48 102 S. Ct. at 1195.
49 Id. Under the Grayned vagueness standard, laws must "give the person of ordinary intel-
ligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." 408 U.S. at 108. See supra note
40.
50 102 S. Ct. at 1195. Additionally, the Court stated that no fair warning issue existed,
since Flipside conceded in its brief that this phrase refers to the structural characteristics of an
item. Id
51 Id. at 1196.
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the admission by its co-operator that it sold "roach clips,"55 which are
used primarily for illegal purposes.56
Justice Marshall noted that since this was a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge, no evidence could exist to indicate whether the ordinance had
been enforced in an arbitary or discriminatory fashion, or with the aim
of inhibiting unpopular speech. 57 He determined, however, that the or-
dinance's language is sufficiently clear that the speculative danger of
arbitrary enforcement does not render the ordinance void for vague-
ness.58 While conceding that the risk of arbitrary enforcement was not
insignificant, 59 Justice Marshall suggested that the possible adoption by
the Village of administrative regulations might eliminate potentially
vague or arbitrary interpretations of the ordinance. The Court chose
not to address possible problems with future applications of the ordi-
nance, stressing that the appropriate time for their consideration is when
they arise.60
III. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA PROBLEM
It seems paradoxical that devices used with controlled substances
may be legally obtained, while use of the controlled substance itself is
prohibited.6' The sale of drug paraphernalia has evolved into a billion
dollar industry that facilitates, even glamorizes, illegal drug use.62 Drug
paraphernalia is most commonly sold through small specialty stores or
55 Article I of the Model Act defines "roach clips" as "objects used to hold burning mate-
rial, such as a marijuana cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the
hand." See supra note 2.
56 102 S. Ct. at 1195. In the same section of the store, Flipside had posted a sign, "You
must be 18 or older to purchase any head supplies." Record at 30.
57 102 S. Ct. at 1196. See infia note 135 and accompanying text.
58 Id.
59 Justice Marshall noted that the village attorney, the village president, and the chief of
police revealed confusion over the applicability of the ordinance concerning certain items, as
well as extensive reliance on the judgment of police officers to interpret the ordinance and
enforce it fairly. Id.
60 By ignoring possible problems with future applications of the ordinance, the Court
greatly simplified its task, at the expense, however, of bringing a greater degree of certainty to
the area. Id. at 1196 n.21.
61 See Drug Paraphemaz' Hearing, supra note 2, at 31 (testimony of Peter B. Bensinger, Ad-
ministrator, Drug Enforcement Administration).
62 In its prefatory note to the Model Act, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice states:
[T]he availability of Drug Paraphernalia has reached epidemic levels. An entire indus-
try has developed which promotes, even glamorizes the illegal use of drugs by adults and
children alike. Sales of drug paraphernalia are reported as high as three billion dollars a
year. What was a small phenomenon at the time the Uniform Act was drafted has now
mushroomed into an industry so well-entrenched that it has its own trade magazine and
associations.
MODEL AcT, supra note 2.
1374 SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE W [Vol. 73
"head shops."'63 The Drug Enforcement Administration of the Depart-
ment -of Justice (DEA) attributes part of the difficulty encountered by
law enforcement officials in halting the sale and use of controlled sub-
stances to the availability of drug paraphernalia. 64 In recent years,65
numerous states and municipalities have enacted laws regulating the
sale of drug paraphernalia. These laws do not directly limit the use of
illegal substances, but rather prohibit the sale and possession of devices
used to prepare or consume drugs. 66
Regulation of the possession or sale of dangerous drugs to promote
the public health, safety and welfare is a valid exercise of the police
powers. 67 The Court has given the states broad flexibility in combatting
drug use, allowing the states to attack not only specific instances of pos-
session and sale, but also the social and economic conditions under
which drug abuse thrives.68 Regulation of illegal drug use through re-
strictions on the purchase and sale of drug paraphernalia appears to be
63 It has been estimated that there are anywhere from 15,000 to 30,000 "head shops" in
the United States. Drug Paraphernalia Hearing, supra note 2, at 87 (Prepared statement of Peter
B. Bensinger). Numerous street peddlers and stores also exist which sell paraphernalia along
with other merchandise. Id. at 87 n.2.
64 Id.
65 Anti-drug paraphernalia legislation is not an entirely recent phenomenon, however.
California outlawed the possession of opium pipes in 1939, later expanding its regulations to
encompass "any device, contrivance, instrument or paraphernalia used for unlawfully inject-
ing or smoking" numerous specified controlled substances. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11364 (West 1980). Prior to 1975, five states outlawed the possession, but not the sale, of
paraphernalia: ALA. CODE § 258(59)(a) (Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11364 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(3)(a)(4)(West Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 35-
24.1-4.1-8 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-105-139 (1973).
The Alabama, Florida, and Indiana statutes have subsequently been revised to prohibit
the sale of paraphernalia as well as its possession. ALA. CODE § 20-2-76 (Supp. 1982); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 893.13(4) (West 1976); IND. CODE § 35-48-4-9 (Supp. 1982). California now
also outlaws the sale of paraphernalia to minors. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364.5
(West Supp. 1981). Mississippi continues to prohibit only the possession of drug parapherna-
lia. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-105(v),-139(e) (Supp. 1980).
66 See, e.g., infra note 76. See generally Comment, Drug Paraphernalia Legislation.- Up in
Smoke? 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 239, 240 n.7 (1981).
67 There can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of its police
power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and habit-
forming drugs. . . .The right to exercise this power is so manifest in the interest of the
public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond
saying that it is too firmly established to be successfully called in question.
Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1925).
68 In addressing California's approach to drug trafficking regulation, the Supreme Court
stated:
Such regulation, it can be assumed, could take a variety of forms. A State might choose
to attack the evils of narcotics traffic on broader fronts also through public health educa-
tion, for example, or by efforts to ameliorate the economic and social conditions under
which those evils might be thought to flourish. In short, the range of valid choice which
a State might make is undoubtedly a wide one, and the wisdom of any particular choice
within the allowable spectrum is not for us to decide.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 (1961).
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well within this broad power of the states to restrict drug use.69
Drafters of drug paraphernalia legislation are confronted with the
task of balancing the necessity of precision of language with the goal of
flexibility of coverage. When the proper balance is not struck, the con-
stitutional infirmities of vagueness and overbreadth often arise. Both
concepts are grounded, regarding states and their subdivisions, in the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 70 While both infirmi-
ties may exist in the same statute, they nevertheless have distinct mean-
ings and purposes. The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a
statute provide persons of common intelligence fair notice of the con-
duct proscribed. 71 On the other hand, lack of clarity is not a component
of the overbreadth doctrine: the terms of the statute may be specific and
clear. Rather, a statute is overbroad if "in its reach it prohibits constitu-
tionally protected conduct. '72
States and municipalities differ in their attempts to devise drug
paraphernalia statutes which are broad in scope, yet free from constitu-
tional infirmities. Paraphernalia statutes have taken one of three
forms.73 The first, a civil enforcement approach, is currently embodied
in the New York State drug paraphernalia law.74 In this system, fines,
revocation of sales licenses or permits, and forfeiture by violators of
items determined to be drug paraphernalia are used to prohibit the pos-
session and sale of drug paraphernalia.75 The New York law prohibits
the possession and sale of enumerated items "used or designed for use"
with controlled substances, and contains a scienter requirement. 76 The
New York law does not authorize criminal sanctions.
Drug paraphernalia legislation may also take a regulatory form. In
69 A strong argument can be made that the availability of drug paraphernalia is a "social
condition under which [drug use] might be thought to flourish." Seegenerak Geiger v. City of
Eager, 618 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1980); Comment, The Conslitutionaliy of Drug Paraphernalia
Laws, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 581, 586, 587 (1981); Comment, supra note 66, at 241-55.
70 The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
.. " U S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
71 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979). See infra notes 113-17 and accompa-
nying text.
72 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114. See infia notes 98-103 and accompany-
ing text.
73 Comment, supra note 66, at 241-255.
74 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 850-853 (McKinney Supp. 1982). § 851 provides that: "It
shall be a violation of this article for any person, firm or corporation to possess with intent to
sell, offer for sale, or purchase drug related paraphernalia under circumstances evincing
knowledge that the paraphernalia is possessed, sold or purchased for one or more. . . drug
related purposes. ... Id. § 851.
75 Id. § 852.
76 Id. §§ 850, 851.
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this approach, currently unique to Hoffman Estates, the sale of drug
paraphernalia is regulated, rather than prohibited. 77 This approach re-
quires that sellers of drug paraphernalia obtain a license; no scienter is
required to violate the ordinance. Merchants must maintain extensive
records concerning purchasers of regulated items. Civil penalties are im-
posed for violators of the ordinance. 78
The third, and most common, form of drug paraphernalia legisla-
tion is the criminal penalty approach. Criminal drug paraphernalia
laws, however, encountered immediate constitutional problems for their
overbreadth and lack of clarity in defining drug paraphernalia. 79 In
1979, the DEA responded to these problems by drafting the Model Drug
Paraphernalia Act (Model Act). 0 The drafters believed that the Model
Act, by defining drug paraphernalia in terms of design and intent for
use, would survive constitutional attacks, and serve as a guide to drafters
of drug paraphernalia legislation, thus introducing a degree of certainty
to the area.8'
The Model Act is divided into sections of definition and prohibi-
tion. "Paraphernalia" is defined in three ways: by definition, by listing
items which could be paraphernalia, and by delineating factors to be
considered in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia. Ar-
tice I of the Model Act contains a detailed definition of "drug parapher-
nalia." In subsection one, drug paraphernalia is defined as anything
which is "used, intended for use, or designed for use" in introducing
controlled substances into the body.82 A list of thirteen specific items
that could be drug paraphernalia is also included in Article I. An intent
element accompanies each item, requiring that the listed items be "used,
intended for use, or designed for use with illegal drugs. '8 3 The second
subsection of Article I describes fourteen factors that "a court or other
authority should consider in addition to all other logically relevant fac-
77 Comment, supra note 66, at 250, 251.
78 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
79 A number of city ordinances enacted prior to drafting of the Model Act were invali-
dated: Geiger v. City of Eagen, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) (Eagen, Minnesota ordinance
void for vagueness); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(Ferndale, Michigan ordinance unconstitutionally fails to give fair notice as to proscribed
conduct); Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979) (Law-
rence, New Jersey ordinance void for vagueness and overbroad in impinging upon retailer's
first amendment rights of free speech); Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297
(D.N.J. 1979) (Newark, New Jersey ordinance struck down as overbroad).
80 See supra note 2.
81 In a Prefatory Note to the Model Act, the DEA stated that the Model Act was drafted
with the aim of overcoming constitutional infirmities that have rendered other drug para-
phernalia statutes unconstitutional. These infirmities were created by difficulties in defining
"drug paraphernalia." MODEL AcT, supra note 2.




tors" "in determining whether an object is 'drug paraphernalia.' ",84
These factors include statements by an owner concerning an object's
use, proximity of the object to a controlled substance or direct violation
of the Act, and the manner in which the item is displayed. 5
Article II, the prohibition section of the Model Act, contains crimi-
nal penalties86 for four offenses. Use of, or possession with the intent to
use, drug paraphernalia with a controlled substance is prohibited. The
delivery or manufacture of drug paraphernalia is prohibited when the
deliverer or manufacturer knows or should reasonably know that the
item will be used with controlled substances. Special offenses accrue for
delivery of drug paraphernalia to a minor. Finally, the advertisement of
drug paraphernalia is prohibited when the advertiser knows, or should
reasonably know, that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote
the sale of items designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia.8 7
Twelve states and numerous municipalities have enacted drug par-
aphernalia laws based on the Model Act.88 The Model Act has failed,
however, to avoid the constitutional infirmities of prior drug parapher-
nalia legislation, but, rather, has been similarly beset by claims of over-
breadth and vagueness. Various circuits of the United States courts of
appeals have disagreed about the Model Act's constitutionality.8 9 In
84 Id.
85 Id. Other relevant factors in determining whether an item is drug paraphernalia are:
prior convictions of an owner relating to controlled substances; the existence of any residue of
controlled substances on the object; evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the owner in-
tended to deliver the items to one whom the owner knows or has reason to know will use the
items with controlled substances; instructions concerning the item's use; descriptive material
covering the item; whether the owner is a legitimate supplier of like or related items; advertis-
ing; evidence of the ratio of sales of the item to total sales of the business; the existence and
scope of legitimate uses for the item; and expert testimony concerning its use. MODEL ACT,
supra note 2, Article I.
86 The determination of the length of imprisonment and the possibility of maximum fines
is left to the particular enacting body.
87 MODEL AcT, supra note 2, Article II.
88 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-22-501,-506 (Supp. 1981); 1980 Conn. Acts 80-224 (Reg.
Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4771-75 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. §§ 893.145-.147 (Supp.
1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2358-1-5 (1981); IND. CODE §§ 35-4804-8.1 to-8.3 (Supp.
1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1031-1036 (West Supp. 1980); MD. [Crim. Law] CODE
ANN. § 287A (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101, -431, -439 to -444 (Supp. 1980);
NJ.S.A. 24:21-46 to 21-53 (West Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1981); An Act to Amend S.C. Code § 44-53-110, Act No. 400 (Approved June 3, 1982,
to be codified Feb., 1983).
89 Compare Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1980)
(invalidating ordinance as void for vagueness), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2227 (1982) with Florida
Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213 (1 1th Cir. 1982)
("designed for use" standard refers to an object's structural characteristics, and is not uncon-
stitutionally vague); Hejira Corp. v. McFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981) (definition of
drug paraphernalia as "any machine, instrument, tool, equipment or device which is primar-
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Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,9° the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit invalidated an Ohio ordinance based almost verbatim on
the Model Act. It held that the "designed for use" with controlled sub-
stances standard was vague and overbroad because no design character-
istics were enumerated to distinguish lawful items from unlawful drug
paraphernalia.9' Stating that the types of objects that can be used as
drug paraphernalia are "limited only by the imagination of the user,"
the Partna court held that since many items which the ordinance deems
as "paraphernalia" have no unique design characteristics, the design
standard is overbroad. 92 In Casbah, Inc. v. Thorne,93 on the other hand,
the eighth circuit upheld a Nebraska statute based on the Model Act,
holding that it did not suffer from vagueness or overbreadth. It deter-
mined that the statute's "designed for use" with controlled substances
language did not render it unconstitutionally vague, since the language
referred to an object's physical attributes, rather than to the intent of
the person charged with the violation.94 It further found that the stat-
ute's intent requirement saved it from unconstitutionally overbroad in-
clusion of innocent items. 95
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOFFMA2N ESTATES Decision
The Supreme Court in H-offinan Estates determined that the ordi-
nance's "designed or marketed for use" standard provided retailers with
adequate warning as to which items are proscribed.96 By focussing on
the objective features of each item sold, however, the ordinance is imper-
missibly vague because it fails to provide guidance concerning items
designed for multiple, legal and illegal, uses. The retailer is thus forced
to speculate as to the scope of the ordinance.
The ordinance's lack of clarity invites arbitrary and discriminatory
interpretation by law enforcement officials. By upholding this ordi-
nance, the Supreme Court sanctioned the confusion and potential abuse
which the vagueness doctrine seeks to prevent.97 Further, by selecting
the Hoffman Estates ordinance for review, rather than the more numer-
ily adopted, designed or intended" for illegal drug use); Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551
(8th Cir. 1981) (upholding Nebraska statute), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1642 (1982).
90 638 F.2d 916 (1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 227 (1982).
91 Id. at 930.
92 Id. at 930, 931.
93 651 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1981).
94 Id. at 560.
95 Id. The Court stated that a seller is within the law as long as he does not actually know
the buyer's purpose, and as long as existing objective factors do not indicate to him that
illegal use will occur. Id. at 561 n.12.
96 102 S. Ct. at 1186.
97 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ous laws based on the Model Act, the Court bypassed an opportunity to
bring a greater degree of certainty to the field of drug paraphernalia
legislation. The Court was correct, however, in holding that the ordi-
nance is not overbroad.
A. OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
A statute is facially void for overbreadth if it " 'does not aim specifi-
cally at evils within the allowable area of (government) control, but...
sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise' of
protected expressive or associational rights.98 An overbroad statute cre-
ates a chilling effect on constitutionally protected conduct. 99 The Court
recognizes, however, that it is impossible to draft a statute which will
never impinge upon a protected right. 100 Hence, a law will not be ad-
judged void on its face for overbreadth unless its infringement upon pro-
tected activities is substantial. Minor infringements, by necessity, will
not be grounds for invalidation.10'
The overbreadth doctrine applies only when first amendment
rights are endangered. 0 2 However, the Court has held that the doctrine
does not apply to commercial speech, reasoning that commercial speech,
linked to commercial well-being, is not as susceptible as non-commercial
speech to the chilling effect created by overbroad regulation. 10 3 The
determination of whether commercial or non-commercial speech is
98 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-24 (1978) (quoting Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (statute prohibiting all picketing restricts peaceful picketing
protected by the first amendment, and is hence void on its face)).
99 "An overbroad statute might serve to chill protected speech. First amendment interests
are fragile interests and a person who contemplates protected activity might be discouraged
by the in terrorem effect of the statute." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
100 See injfa note 110 and accompanying text.
101 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), state employees challenged an
Oklahoma statute which prohibited civil service employees from belonging to any political
party committee, running for any paid political office, or taking part in the affairs of any
political party or campaign "except to exercise [the] right [as citizens] privately to express
.. .opinion[s] and vote." Id. at 604 n.1. The Court rejected the employees' facial challenge,
holding that while the law may reach certain protected areas of conduct, such as wearing
campaign buttons and displaying bumper stickers, such infringements were insubstantial
when compared to the legitimate applications of the law. Id. at 609-18. Broadrick thus seems
to indicate that the Court will use a balancing test to determine whether the infringement
upon protected interests outweighs the state interest reflected in the statute. If so, the statute
is void for overbreadth. See generaly L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at § 12-25.
102 See generalo,, L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at § 12-24; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine," 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
103 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
at 566 n.8; 433 U.S. 350, 380-81. The Court in Virginia Pharmaty noted that different degrees
of protection are accorded to commercial and non-commercial speech. 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24. To justify this difference, the Court reasoned that commercial speech may be more
durable since it is essential for commercial success, and, therefore, it is unlikely that advertis-
ing would be entirely foregone due to the threat of an overbroad statute.
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threatened is thus of crucial importance in an overbreadth analysis. It is
essential that a court fully explore the nature of the alleged infringement
upon first amendment activities.
The Court in HoJman Estates determined that the Village ordinance
did not embrace non-commercial speech, but simply regulated the com-
mercial marketing of items whose labels suggest use for an illicit pur-
pose.' 0 4 Justice Marshall reasoned that the ordinance does not regulate
the sale of literature itself, but rather regulates the sale of items dis-
played "with" or "within proximity of" "literature encouraging illegal
use of cannabis or illegal drugs."' 1 5 Hence, no first amendment activity
is threatened. This reasoning ignores, however, the possibility that
merchants will be deterred from selling this literature out of fear that its
proximity to other items will, under the terms of guidelines, 06 taint the
items, causing them to be deemed drug paraphernalia. The ordinance
may thus force the merchant to choose between the display of literature
that encourages drug use and the display of otherwise innocent items. 10 7
Even assuming that a merchant could be deterred from displaying
literature for this reason, this infringement upon protected rights does
not appear sufficiently substantial to warrant an overbreadth finding. A
merchant can avoid most of the resulting hardship by not displaying the
literature "within proximity of" the suspect items.'08 While this forces a
merchant to display merchandise in a manner he might not ordinarily
choose, he is not prevented from displaying the merchandise, nor is he
prevented from displaying the items prominently. Broadrick v.
Oklahoma 109 must be read here as a balancing test, weighing the legiti-
mate and illegitimate applications of a law. A statute will be upheld in
the face of minor constitutional infringements if a strong state interest
exists to outweigh the burdens imposed. It does not appear that the
threatened overbroad applications of the Hoffman ordinance are of suf-
ficient magnitude to outweigh the state's interest in preventing drug
abuse through the proper application of the ordinance. Thus, the Hoff-
man ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad. 10
104 102 S. Ct. at 1192.
105 Id. (citing Guidelines, supra note 9).
106 Guidelines, supra note 9.
107 Flipside contended that this inhibiting effect on literature serves as a prior restraint on
its first amendment rights. Brief for Appellee at 25 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963)).
108 This assumes, however, that the merchant can determine, to the satisfaction of law
enforcement officials, what constitutues "proximity." "Proximity" is not defined in the ordi-
nance or guidelines.
109 413 U.S. 601. See supra note 101.
110 Policy considerations suggest that it would be unwise to allow such a minimal burden
on the rights of retailers to topple the Hoffman ordinance for overbreadth. It is the rare
legislature indeed that can draft a law which in no instances will threaten a protected right. Cf.
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The restriction of the overbreadth doctrine to infringements on first
amendment activities substantially limits the doctrine's applicability to
drug paraphernalia legislation. The Hoffnan Estates Court did not ad-
dress, but clearly did not follow, the overbreadth approach of the sixth
circuit in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. Ciy of Parma.I 'I In finding the
Parma drug paraphernalia ordinance overbroad, the sixth circuit stated
that the overbreadth doctrine prohibits a statute from making innocent
or protected conduct criminal. 1 2 The protection of "innocent" conduct
obviously greatly expands the scope of the overbreadth doctine, and
would make almost all drug paraphernalia legislation constitutionally
suspect for overbreadth. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
in order to void a statute for overbreadth, constitutionally protected,
rather than merely innocent, conduct must be proscribed." t3
B. VAGUENESS ANALYSIS
A law is void on its face under the due process clause if it is so vague
that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing and differ as to its application."' "t 4 Unlike overbreadth, the pro-
scribed conduct need not be protected by the first amendment to be
unconstitutionally vague." t5 The Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford16
enunciated a two-pronged vagueness test: a statute must provide fair
warning as to what activities are proscribed, and it must provide explicit
standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." t7 The
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,304 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("it is very easy to read a
statute to permit some hypothetical violation of civil rights but difficult to draft one which
will not be subject to the same infirmity"). The degree of infringement is of critical impor-
tance. If minor infringements upon protected rights were sufficient to void a statute for over-
breadth, legislatures would be constructively prevented from performing their law making
function.
justice Marshall also noted that the only commercial speech implicated by the ordinance
was the "attenuated" interest in display and marketing of the items. The only communica-
tion of commercial information that results is the promotion of illegal drug use. Such speech
proposes an illegal transaction, which can be regulated or banned entirely. 102 S. Ct. at 1192
(citing 447 U.S. 557, 563-64).
Iti 638 F.2d 916. Ste supra note 90 and accompanying text.
112 Id. at 927.
113 L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at § 12-24; Comment, supra note 69, at 588.
114 L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at § 12-28 (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
115 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (statute criminalizing "gang" membership
void for vagueness); L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at § 12-28.
116 408 U.S. 104, 108. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
117 Id. As with overbreadth analyses, vagueness determinations highlight the basic tension
between drafting an extremely precise statute whose scope is consequently narrow, and draft-
ing a broad, flexible statute which, while perhaps satisfying the initial legislative goal, pros-
cribes innocent conduct as well. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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level of statutory clarity requisite to satisfy these two demands increases
if the statute threatens the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.1 18
Vagueness challenges to drug paraphernalia legislation are founded
on the theory that the term "drug paraphernalia" is too ill-defined to
give adequate notice as to proscribed items.' 19 Thus, the Hoffman ordi-
nance's definition of "drug paraphernalia" as any item "designed or
marketed for use" with illegal drugs 120 must be analyzed to determine
whether it provides retailers with the requisite warning. For Justice
Marshall and the Court, this definition sufficed to provide persons of
common intelligence fair warning as to what is proscribed. 121
The Hoffman Court decided that the "designed . . .for use" stan-
dard clearly means that items "principally used" for non-drug purposes,
by virtue of their objective features, are not "designed. . .for use" with
illegal drugs, and hence not regulated by the ordinance. 122 This stan-
dard requires that a retailer make a determination as to the manufac-
turer's intent regarding design. By focussing on the design of the
manufacturer, however, the ordinance fails to address items which have
many established uses, both licit and illicit. Instead, this interpretation
assumes that a single, easily discernible manufacturing intent exists for
each item. Some items may have only drug-related uses. Obviously, a
syringe is clearly "designed . . . for use" with drugs, and a retailer
would be warned by the statute that he was selling a regulated item.
Many other items, however, become drug paraphernalia based on the
user's later adaptation, rather than because of their objective features.
Attempting to classify various pipes, spoons, clips, rolling papers, and
other merchandise which have common legitimate uses, on the basis of
whether or not they are designed to be "principally used" with illegal
drugs is a speculative exercise. It would appear difficult to assert with
any degree of certainty that a retailer would usually know the intent of
the manufacturer of such multi-use items. Because of this uncertainty,
the Hoffman ordinance fails to give adequate notice as to what is a regu-
lated item. 123
Another problem with the ordinance is that the "designed or mar-
118 102 S. Ct. at 1193 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972);
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109).
119 See generally Comment, supra note 69, at 593; Comment, supra note 66, at 257.
120 Village of Hoffman Estates, Ill., Ordinance No. 909-1978, § 1 (see Appendix).
121 See supra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
122 102 S. Ct. at 1195.
123 Noting that the Hoffman ordinance's requirements could be triggered by the sale of
paper clips next to "Rolling Stone" magazine, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that "there is no way for a seller to determine which particular items or arrangement of
merchandise will require a license." 639 F.2d at 382-83.
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keted for use" standard begs the question at issue. The court of appeals
noted that the standard's application presupposes that retailers can
make the determination of whether an item is drug paraphernalia be-
cause they are actually engaged in the business of selling items designed
or manufactured for use with illegal drugs. 124 Flipside denies this char-
acterization of its business. 125
It is also obvious that the ordinance's definitional problems cannot
be resolved simply by promulgating supplemental guidelines. 126 Such
guidelines would introduce further definitional problems. If, as the
Court believes, the designed for use standard sufficiently defines items to
be classified as "drug paraphernalia," then the guidelines would be un-
necessary. On the other hand, if guidelines are viewed as a necessary
supplement to the ordinance's text, an examination of the existing Hoff-
man guidelines reveals that they may create more confusion than clar-
ity. The guidelines, for example, indicate that pipes are not covered by
the ordinance if "displayed away from the proximity of" colored paper,
and "not displayed within the proximity of roach clips, or literature en-
couraging illegal use of. . . drugs."' 127 Nowhere in the ordinance or
guidelines is "proximity" defined, however. The retailer is thus forced
to decide whether an item is drug paraphernalia by speculating as to the
meaning of "proximity," a determination about which persons of com-
mon intelligence might reasonably differ. Reliance upon supplementa-
tion of these guidelines as a method of salvaging the ordinance thus
seems misplaced.
Although the Court noted that a scienter requirement may mitigate
a law's vagueness, 28 commentators have asserted that a scienter require-
ment cannot cure a vague statute or regulation. 29 Under the Court's
reasoning, the Hoffman ordinance is not vague because it prohibits re-
tailers from "intentionally," "willingly," or "knowingly" marketing
items used with illegal drugs. One "knowingly" commits an offense
when he knows that his actions will bring about a certain result. It is
immaterial that one knows that intent is an element of the offense, or
that intentionally causing such a result is statutorily prohibited. 30
Since it is knowledge of the consequences of one's actions, not knowledge
of the existence of the law, which is relevant, it appears that a vague
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., supra note 9.
127 Id.
128 See supra note 43.
129 See, e.g., W. LEFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 11 at 86, 87 (1972); Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) Uackson, J., dissenting).
130 W. LEFAvE & A. Scor, JR., supra note 129.
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statute is not clarified by a scienter element. 131 It is possible for a re-
tailer to "willfully" display items that are in fact "drug paraphernalia"
(which under the Court's reasoning, would indicate that he knew that
the item was drug paraphernalia), without fair warning or knowledge
that the items are indeed proscribed.
The second prong of the Grayned vagueness standard requires that a
statute be sufficiently clear so as to prevent the danger of arbitrary or
discriminatory application by enforcement officials. Justice Marshall,
particularly impressed by the ordinance's marketing standard, found the
ordinance clear enough so that "the speculative danger of arbitrary en-
forcement does not render the ordinance void for vagueness."' 132 This
pronouncement, however, is based upon the Court's belief that the ordi-
nance's "designed or marketed for use" standard has no definitional
problems. The ordinance's demonstrated definitional problems, as well
as its circularity-the presupposition that a retailer knows what items
are "designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs" because he engages
in their sale133-creates the possibility of arbitrary enforcement. Due to
the multiple uses of many items which potentially could be deemed
"drug paraphernalia," enforcement officials are free to make subjective
determinations as to their use. The possibility that such determinations
will be based in part or whole upon the decision-maker's perception of a
person's or group's lifestyle is very real. 134 The vagueness of the Hoff-
man Estates ordinance thus allows for potential harassment of those
with lifestyles different from those enforcing the ordinance. 35
131 Id.
132 102 S. Ct. at 1196 (footnotes omitted).
133 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
134 The seventh circuit noted that Hoffman Estates had already demonstrated bias when
stating in their brief: "Defendant village does expect that the marketing approach that en-
courages drug use by youth will be eliminated by responsible businesses and conducted under
reasonable regulation by other businesses," a stigma that should not be attached according to
the tastes of village officials. 639 F.2d at 384 (citing Brief for Appellee at 11).
135 The seventh circuit in Hofman Estates found that a genuine danger exists that the ordi-
nance will be used to harass individuals choosing lifestyles and views different from those of
the cultural majority. The court emphasized that if an item is not considered drug
paraphernalia per se, then subjective factors are introduced into the interpretation of a re-
tailer's marketing approach. d. at 383. Quoting Housworth v. Glisson, 485 F. Supp. 29, 38
(N.D. Ga. 1978), afld, 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated:
Most people may agree that selling devices which may have no obvious purpose other
than to facilitate the use of dangerous drugs threatens the community's health, welfare
and safety. But the decision of which devices fit this category becomes more difficult
when something as innocuous and susceptible of legal or merely decorative use as a "ma-
rijuana pipe" is involved. Whether selling this merchandise falls within the ordinance's
prohibition is a debatable question, particularly when conficting hfestyles and pohical iews
suffise the decision-maker's perception of what buyers will do with the product
639 F.2d at 383-84 (emphasis in the original).
1384 [Vol. 73
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA1
C. SELECTION OF CASE FOR REVIEW
The Supreme Court's selection of the Hoffman Estates ordinance
for review seems unusual in light of the widespread litigation concerning
drug paraphernalia laws based on the Model Act.136 Unlike the Model
Act, which has been adopted by twelve states and numerous municipali-
ties, the Hoffman ordinance, with its regulatory approach, is peculiar to
the Village of Hoffman Estates. Differences between the Hoffman Es-
tates ordinance and laws based on the Model Act are sufficiently signifi-
cant that the determination of the constitutionality of one will not
resolve the constitutionality of the other.137 The Court has remanded
Record Revolution No. 6 v. City of Parma for reconsideration in light of the
Hoftian Estates decision.138 The confusion in the lower courts is, there-
fore, far from resolved by the Hofmnan Estates decision. By choosing to
review the Hoffman ordinance, the Court has left the constitutionality
of laws based upon the Model Act in doubt, hence bringing very little
certainty to the field of drug paraphernalia legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
In Village of Hoffnan Estates v. Fliside, Hojnan Estates, Inc., the
Supreme Court determined that defining "drug paraphernalia" as those
items "designed or marketed for use" with illegal drugs provided suffi-
cient clarity to defeat a vagueness challenge. By focussing on design,
however, the ordinance fails to provide adequate guidance as to items
which have multiple lawful and drug-related uses. This lack of clarity
forces retailers to speculate as to the items covered by the ordinace, and
invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law enforcement
officials. Drug abuse remains a very serious problem in this country,
and easy access to items which facilitate the use of illegal drugs can only
exacerbate the problem. This does not justify, however, the regulation
of such devices by unconstitutional means.
JEFFREY J. VAWRINEK
136 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
137 The Model Act, unlike the Hoffman ordinance, contains a mental state element con-
cerning the intent of the item's user-the item must be "used, intended for use or designed for
use" with illegal drugs. The sole mental state language in the Hoffman ordinance concerns
objects which are "designed or marketed for use" with illegal drugs. Whereas the Model Act
contains criminal penalties, the Hoffman ordinance is "regulatory in nature." Unlike the
Hoffman ordinance, the Model Act includes no guidelines as to proscribed items, but merely
includes a laundry list of regulated merchandise.
138 Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916 (1981).
1982] 1385
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE [o7
APPENDIX
Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance No. 969-1978 AN ORDI-
NANCE AMENDING THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE VIL-
LAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES BY PROVIDING FOR
REGULATION OF ITEMS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR
USE WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS
WHEREAS, certain items designed or marketed for use with illegal
drugs are being retailed within the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook
County, Illinois, and
WHEREAS, there is evidence that these items are designed or marketed
for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and it is in the best interests of the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Hoffman Estates to regulate
within the Village the sale of items designed or marketed for use with
illegal cannabis or drugs.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the President and Board
of Trustees of the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook County, Illinois, as
follows:
Section 1: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by
adding thereto an additional section, Section 8-7-16, which reads as
follows:
Sec. 8-7-16--ITEMS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE
WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS
A. License Required:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons as principal, clerk,
agent or servant to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or
thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs, as defined by Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a
license therefore. Such licenses shall be in addition to any or all
other licenses held by applicant.
B. Application:
Application to sell any item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or
thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs shall, in addition to the requirements of Article 8-1, be ac-
companied by affidavits by applicant and each and every employee
authorized to sell such items that such person has never been con-
victed of a drug-related offense.
C. Minors:
It shall be unlawful to sell or give items as described in Section 8-7-
16A in any form to any male or female child under eighteen years
of age.
D. Records:
Every licensee must keep a record of every item, effect, parapherna-
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lia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with
illegal cannabis or drugs which is sold and this record shall be open
to the inspection of any police officer at any time during the hours
of business. Such record shall contain the name and address of the
purchaser, the name and quantity of the product, the date and time
of sale, and the licensee or agent of the licensee's signature, such
records shall be retained for not less than two (2) years.
E. Regulations:
The applicant shall comply with all applicable regulations of the
Department of Health Services and the Police Department.
Section 2: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by
adding to Sec. 8-2-1 Fees: Merchants (Products) the additional lan-
guage as follows:
Items designed or Marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs
$150.00.
Section 3: Penalty. Any person violating any provision of this ordinance
shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than five hun-
dred dollars ($500.00) for the first offense and succeeding offenses during
the same calendar year, and each day that such violation shall continue
shall be deemed a separate and distinct offense.
Section 4: That the Village Clerk be and is hereby authorized to publish
this ordinance in pamphlet form.
Section 5: That this ordinance shall be in full force and effect May 1,
1978, after passage, approval and publication according to law.
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